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TITLE VII AND POSTJUDGMENT CLASS ACTIONS
The purpose of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 is to
eliminate employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex
or national origin. In the recent decisions of Sprogis v. United Air Lines,
Inc.2 and Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,3 the courts of appeals for
the Seventh and Fifth Circuits differed on the propriety of court in-
itiated class actions in Title VII suits after a judgment on the merits.
In Sprogis, the plaintiff was discharged by United Air Lines for
violating a company policy requiring stewardesses to remain unmarried.
In granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the district
court held that the no-marriage rule contravened Title VII and ordered
Mrs. Sprogis' reinstatement with back pay.4 Although the complaint
sought only individual relief, the court retained jurisdiction to consider
extending class action relief.' The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding
that in Title VII cases class actions may be initiated by the court after a
judgment on the merits.6
The plaintiff in Danner was discharged by her employer because of
an economy move that allegedly eliminated her job. The district court
found that Mrs. Danner was actually discharged because she, like all
female employees in the defendant's plant, had no seniority or bidding
rights to enable her to transfer to another job within the employer's
plant.' When her position was discontinued her job was assigned to male
employees who had these seniority rights. The district court held that
1. §§ 701-16; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Act].
2. 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), affg 308 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. IIl. 1970). A
petition for certiorari was filed on October 1, 1971. 40 U.S.L.W. 3167 (U.S.) (No.
71-468).
3. 447 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1971), nwdifying 1 CCH EmPL. PRAc. GUIDE 8336
(W.D. Tex. May 18, 1970).
4. 308 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. Ill. 1970). The court held that United's no-marriage
policy violated § 703(a) (1) of the Act because a similar policy was not applied to
male cabin attendants on certain foreign flights who performed duties comparable to
those of stewardesses. Section 703 (a) states, in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer- (1) to . . .
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
' * * because of said individual's . . . sex.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
For an overall discussion of no-marriage rules imposed by airline companies, see
Binder, Sex Discrimiation in the Airline Industry: Title VI1 Flying High, 59 CALIF.
L. REv. 1091 (1971).
5. 308 F. Supp. at 962.
6. 444 F. 2d at 1201-02.
7. 1 CCH EmPL. PRAc. GUIDE 8336 (W.D. Tex. May 18, 1970).
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the plaintiff was discriminatorily discharged in violation of Title VII and
ordered Mrs. Danner's reinstatement with back pay. The court also
granted class relief by both enjoining the defendant from further dis-
crimination against its female employees and by retaining jurisdiction to
insure that the defendant would initiate a system of equal seniority
rights.' The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court
decision but modified the judgment. The court held that since Mrs.
Danner had brought suit in her name alone and, therefore, had not ful-
filled the requirements of rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, the judgment could not include class relief.9
The contrary results of Sprogis and Danner are significant since
both the Seventh and Fifth Circuits have repeatedly favored Title VII
claimants." This divergence over postjudgment class relief raises serious
questions concerning judicial enforcement of Title VIi.
THE CONCILIATION PROCESS OF TITLE VII
Passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was "an epic legislative
struggle."'" Much of the Act's controversy centered on Title VII,
particularly on its enforcement provisions. 2 The Act ultimately provided
for an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),'" whose
8. Id. at 6993-208.
9. 447 F.2d at 163-64.
10. See generally Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir.
1970); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969);
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Cox v. United States
Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1969) ; Heat & Frost Workers, Local 53 v. Vogler,
407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Dent v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir.
1969) ; Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968).
11. Vass, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & Cox. L. Pav. 431, 445
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Vass]. The Senate debated the bill for 83 days, during
which time 87 amendments were offered to the proposed bill. See BNA, THP CrviL
RIGHTS AcT OF 1964 (1964) [hereinafter cited as BNA] ; EEOC, LEGISLATIagvE HISTORY
OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CML RIGHTS AcT OF 1964, at 10-11 (1964) [hereinafter cited
as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
12. The original version of the bill as introduced in the House (H.R. 405) pro-
vided for administrative cease and desist orders. This was objected to vigorously by
House Republicans. In the Senate a bill introduced by Senator Humphrey (S. 1937)
provided for enforcement of equal employment opportunities by an administrator.
H.R. 7152, as recommended by the House Judiciary Committee, provided for en-
forcement by the courts but placed primary responsibility for bringing suits upon the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. While H.R. 7152 was still being debated
on the Senate floor, Senate leaders held a series of conferences that resulted in a
Senate substitute amendment, No. 656. This amendment, which was eventually passed
by both Houses, removed the Commission's power to bring suit and shifted this re-
sponsibility to private individuals. See BNA, s=pra note 11, at 17-22, 313; LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 11, at 8-11, 3003-21; 110 CONG. R .c. 12721-25 (1964).
13. Act § 705(a) ; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (1970).
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function is to investigate charges of employment discrimination and to
eliminate such discrimination through conciliation.'4 Once conciliatory
attempts prove unsuccessful the bulk of enforcement responsibility is
placed on private litigants through actions brought in federal courts. 5
To effectuate the goal of conciliation an intricate procedural frame-
work was built into Title VII. Before an aggrieved individual can bring
suit he must file a charge with the EEOC within ninety days of the
alleged discriminatory act.' 6 The EEOC, after determining whether
reasonable cause exists to believe a violation has occurred, attempts
conciliation with the employer." If conciliation fails, the Commission
notifies the complainant of his right to bring an action within thirty days
in federal court.'"
Although Title VII has procedures to effectuate its policy of concil-
iation, these guidelines have been ignored frequently in order to insure
recovery for claimants.'" For example, courts have disregarded filing
14. Act § 705 (a)-(j) ; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) to (j) (1970).
15. If . . . the Commission has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance
with this title . . . a civil action may be brought against the respondent
by the person claiming to be aggrieved....
Act § 706(e) ; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970).
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is inten-
tionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the com-
plaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
back pay ...
Act § 706(g) ; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-S(g) (1970).
16. Act § 706(d); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1970). This period is extended
if the person first pursues his remedy through a state agency in accordance with §
706(b) of the Act.
17. Act § 706(a) ; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1970).
18. Act § 706(e); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970). Section 706(e) gives the
EEOC a maximum of sixty days in which to conciliate the charge. For a few months
the Commission sent out notice-to-sue letters after sixty days on complaints that had
never been submitted to the conciliation process. Eventually, swamped with charges,
the EEOC announced that it would no longer adhere strictly to the deadline in § 706(e),
but would issue notice-to-sue letters only after conciliation had been attempted and
had failed. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25(a) (1970).
19. Courts that have bypassed these procedural requirements have admitted that
conciliation is an important policy of Title VII. See Hutchings v. United States Indus.,
Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 309 (5th Cir. 1970); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d
711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969) ; Dent v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 406 F.2d 399, 402 (5th Cir.
1968).
Legislative history has given the courts little help in determining the relative
importance of the concilitation policy. There is no committee report or hearing record
on Senate Substitute Amendment No. 656, which significantly altered H.R. 7152.
See note 12 supra. There is also no Senate-House conference report, for the House
agreed to all the Senate amendments. 110 CONG. REc. 15897 (1964). Only the congres-
sional debates remain as possible indicators of legislative intent. The result is con-
fusion. Witness the contradictory remarks of Senator Humphrey, a primary spokes-
man for the bill, found on the same page of the Congressional Record:
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requirements,2  reasonable cause determinations,"' conciliation attempts, 2
and time limitations." The postjudgment class relief granted in Sprogis
represents the clearest disregard to date for these procedural requirements.
We do not appoint Commissions as wall decorations. Their job is to do
something.
The individual may proceed in his own right at any time. He may
take his complaint to the Commission, he may bypass the Commission, or
he may go directly to court.
110 CONG. REc. 14188 (1964). See also Dent v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 406 F.2d 399,
403 (th Cir. 1969): "The Congressional . . . debates lend great comfort to both
sides. This, we believe, leaves no clearly discernible Congressional intent. . . ." Despite
the meager legislative history of Title VII, an examination of the entire 1964 Act
reveal' a clear intention to favor conciliation over court enforcement. Title II, dealing
with discrimination in public accomodations, states that after a civil action has been
brought, the court may refer the matter to the Community Relations Service as long as
the court believes there is a reasonable possibility of obtaining voluntary compliance.
Act § 204(d) ; 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(d) (1970). Title IV, concerning the desegregation
of public education, precludes the Attorney General from filing sult until the school
board has had a reasonable time to correct any discriminatory practice. Act § 407(a) ;
42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1970). Title VI, affecting discrimination in federally assisted
programs, prohibits discontinuation of federal funding until it is determined that the
discriminatory practice cannot be terminated by voluntary means. Act § 602; 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d-1 (1970). Title X establishes a Community Relations Service to assist in
resolving disputes by conference and conciliation. Act § 1002; 42 U.S.C. § 2000g-1
(1970).
20. Courts have held that all eligible complainants need not file charges with the
EEOC to join in a class action. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th
Cir. 1969) ; Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Oatis v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968).
However, courts have never dispensed with the filing requirements entirely, and at
least one class member must still have filed a charge. Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.,
398 F.2d 496, 497-98 (5th Cir. 1968).
21. Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Const. Corp., 437 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1971) ; Fekete
v. U.S. Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1970); Grimm v. Washington Elec. Corp.,
300 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
Some courts have taken this line of reasoning one step further and have held that
an EEOC finding of "no cause" against the complainant does not bar his suit in federal
court. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 1 CCH EmPL. PnAc. GUIDE 8267 (4th Cir. July
1, 1971) ; Flowers v. Laborers Local 6, 431 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1970). See Developments
in the Law-Employnent Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 5964,
84 H.Rv. L. Rxv. 1109, 1204-06 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Title VII].
22. Although we agree with Phillips that one purpose of Title VII is to
enforce voluntary compliance, its contention that EEOC efforts to conciliate
are a jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII action borders on being frivolous.
It is now too well settled to discuss that no EEOC effort to conciliate is re-
quired before a federal court may entertain a Title VII action.
Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 447 F.2d 159, 161 (5th Cir. 1971). See also Dent v.
St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 406 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969); Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line
R.R., 405 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1968) ; Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357
(7th Cir. 1968). Contra, Mickel v. South Carolina State Empl. Serv., 377 F.2d 239 (4th
Cir. 1967).
23. Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); Choate v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968). See generally Annot., 4 A.L.R.
Fed. 833 (1970).
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These procedures were instituted to facilitate conciliation by insuring
that all charges against the employer are aired in the complaint and
channeled through the conciliation process. Therefore, Sprogis under-
mines statutory policy by allowing recovery to a class of potential litigants
whose existence was not contemplated throughout conciliation.
Although these results have been justified by assertions that a mere
technicality should not bar relief, 4 the most probable reason for this
indifference is the ineffectiveness of the conciliation process.25 Although
in fiscal year 1970 the EEOC found reasonable cause to suspect Title
VII violations in 16,400 cases, 6 in thousands of instances conciliation
was never attempted. Moreover, conciliation was successful or partially
successful in only 450 cases. 7 The process is so cumbersome that in the
24. See, e.g., Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 402 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1968):
[Ilt would be unnecessarily harsh and in derogation of the interests of those
whom the Act was designed to protect to interpret the statutory language as
denying substantive rights in the district court because of procedural defects
before the Commission.
Id. at 360. See also Dent v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 406 F.2d 399, 403 (5th Cir. 1969).
25. At the close of fiscal year 1970, the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission . . . will have been in operation for 5 years. It is not much closer
to the goal of the elimination of employment discrimination than it was at its
inception.
UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT
1971, at 135 (1971) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL EFFORT] ; see F. COUSENS, PUBLIC
CIVIL RIGHTS AGENCIES AND FAIR EMPLOYMENT 114 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
COUSENS]:
[C]reation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission did not fulfill
either the promise or performance of a federal commission.
Many reasons have been offered for the EEOC's ineffectiveness, chiefly its lack
of enforcement power and grossly inadequate staff and budget resources. (Originally
staffed and budgeted for 2,000 complaints per year, the EEOC received nearly 9,000 in
its first year alone.) See FEDERAL EFFORT, sukpra, at 102, 135.
H.R. 1746, passed by the House on September 16, 1971 and currently being con-
sidered by the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare would grant the EEOC power to bring Title VII suits itself on behalf of the
aggrieved complainant. H.R. 1746, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. (1971). S. 2515, also under con-
sideration by the same Senate Subcommittee, would grant the EEOC cease and desist
powers. S. 2515, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See 78 LAB. REL. REP. 59 (1971).
26. EEOC, FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT-FISCAL YEAR 1970, at 29, 63 [hereinafter
cited as FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT]. Of these cases, 11,300 originated in fiscal year 1970;
5,100 were carried over from fiscal year 1969. Id. at 64.
27. A successful agreement is one to which the EEOC, the respondent and the
charging party are all signatories. In a partially successful conciliation the respondent
agrees to end the discrimination cited in the charge but will not sign an agreement
saying he has discriminated against the complainant. FEDERAL EFFORT, supra note
25, at 104 n.715.
Statistics can be confusing on this issue. The EEOC is successfully conciliating
about 38 per cent of the charges it attempts. But, due to backlog and delay, it is only
attempting to conciliate seven per cent of the total complaints received. Therefore,
its true successful conciliation rate, measured against all charges in which reasonable
cause had been found, is only 2.7 per cent. See FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
26, at 63.
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first seven months of fiscal year 1971, the backlog of meritorious cases
has reached 25,195.2" As a result, prospective Title VII complainants can
now expect a two year delay before their charge is even submitted to
conciliation. -0
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PROVISIONS OF TITLE VII
Title VII states that a charge "shall be filed within 90 days after
the alleged unlawful practice.""0 This provision, which purports to be the
Act's statute of limitations, has been continually circumvented. As to
non-filing class members, courts have held the ninety-day requirement to
be only a statutory precondition to filing a charge with the EEOC.
Therefore, according to the courts a timely filing by one class member
satisfies the requirement for the entire class."' Generally, however, the
alleged discriminatory offense has been labeled a "continuing violation"
for which no particular act would be said to commence the running of the
limitation period. Examples of such "continuing violations" are dis-
28. Hearings on H.R. 1746 Before the General Subcomin. on Labor of the
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 81, 95 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings] (statement of EEOC chairman).
29. FDERAL EFFORT, supra note 25, at 99. The deleterious effects of such a delay
are brought out by the New Jersey-1lumrosen study of the effectiveness of state
fair employment practices commissions. The study showed that during the drawn-out
commission investigation process, many former complainants would seek and find otherjobs, therafter withdrawing their complaints. The study concluded: "The time involved
between filing and final disposition was usually too long for most claimants to be
without a job." CousENs, supra note 25, at 8.
30. Act § 706(a) ; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1970).
31. See Russell v. American Tobacco Co., 1 CCH EmIL. PRac. GUIDE 8117(M.D.N.C. Jan. 20, 1971); Sciaraffa v. Oxford Paper Co., 310 F. Supp. 891 (D. Me.
1970):
It is now settled that a class action can be maintained under Title VII, and
that only one member of the class need file timely charges with the EEOC.
Id. at 897 n.9. See also Madlock v. Sardis Luggage Co., 302 F. Supp. 866, 871 (N.D.
Miss. 1969).
Despite the declaration in Sciaraffa, this issue does not yet appear "settled."
See United States v. Georgia Power Co., 1 CCH EmPL. PRAc. GUIDE 8318 (N.D.
Ga. June 30, 1971).
Allowing one class member to satisfy the ninety-day filing limitation not only
raises questions under Title VII, but conflicts with traditional case law on class actions
and statutes of limitations. In a normal class action, the applicable statute of
limitations is tolled for the entire class by the original plaintiff. 3B J. MooRE, Mooe's
FEmRA PRACTICE 23.90 at 23-1651 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as MOORE] ;
2 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 568, at 315 (C.
Wright rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as BARaox z HoLTzoFF]. However, it is
commonly accepted that the applicable statute of limitations must not have been a
bar to the ability of other class members to bring an individual action at the time the
class action was instituted. See, e.g., Slack v. Stiner, 358 F.2d 65, 70 (5th Cir. 1966) ;
Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 732-33 (2d Cir. 1965). See also
Comment, Class Actions Under New Rude 23 and Federal Statutes of Limitation: A
Study of Conflicting Rationale, 13 V=t. L. REv. 370, 373 (1968).
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criminatory layoffs, 2 plantwide racial discrimination, 3 biased testing
prodedures," segregted washrooms,V3  discriminatory promotional
systems36 and discriminatory seniority7 and retirement plans. 8
It has been argued that judicial circumvention of the limitation
period is harsh to a good-faith defendant.39 An employer will often main-
tain a long standing policy which all parties believe to be nondiscrimina-
tory. If one employee successfully prosecutes a Title VII claim, however,
Sprogis-type class relief could expand an employer's liability far beyond
32. Sciaraffa v. Oxford Paper Co., 310 F. Supp. 891, 896-97 (D. Me. 1970);
see Cox v. United States Gypsum Co., 409 F.2d 289, 290-91 (7th Cir. 1969) (fact
that plaintiffs explicitly alleged a "continuing" discriminatory layoff was sufficient
foundation for an action based on discrimination in failing to recall them to work).
33. Banks v. Lockheed Georgia Co., 46 F.R.D. 442 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
34 King v. Georgia Power Co., 295 F. Supp. 943, 945-46 (N.D. Ga. 1968),
decided on merits sub nor. United States v. Georgia Power Co., 1 CCH EtXPL. PRAC
GuIDE 1 8318 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 1971).
35. Id.
36. Id.; Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. Quinn, 1 CCH EmPL. PRAc. GUIDE 8237
(N.D. Cal. May 26, 1971).
37. Tippet v. Ligget & Myers Tobacco Co., 316 F. Supp. 292 (M.D.N.C. 1970).
38. Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
40 U.S.L.W. 3212 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1971).
39. See Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1207 (7th Cir. 1971)
(dissenting opinion of Stevens, Cir. J.). That Congress is clearly aware of a potential
unfairness is evidenced by the House debate preceding passage of H.R. 1746. Section
(e) of the bill amends subsection (h) of § 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 142
U.S.C. 2000e-5] to read, in part:
No order made hereafter shall include back pay or other liability which has
accrued more than two years before the filing of a complaint with said court
under this title.
H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § (e) (1971).
Congressman John Erlenborn (R., Ill.), sponsor of the substitute bill which event-
ually passed as H.R. 1746 stated:
At the present time there seems to be no limit to how far back pay awards can
be made on behalf of a party who wins one of these actions, except to the
beginning of the act, which has the effective date of 1965.
iT]he liability of backpay without limitation would create an horrendous
potential liability.
We also feel that the cause of due process will be best served if our sub-
stitute is adopted providing . . . a statute of limitations so that back pay
awards cannot be rendered in the year 2000 all the way back to the year 1965,
as the courts are apparently holding at the present time.
117 CONG. REc. 8473-74 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1971).
Congressman Erlenborn's efforts are quite subtle. A previous amendment to
H.R. 1746 read:
[N]o order made hereunder shall include back pay or reinstatement liability
which has accrued more than two years before the filing of a charge with the
CommisLon.
117 CONG. REc. 8482 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1971) (emphasis added).
By changing the section to "filing of a complaint with said court" (emphasis
added), even more back pay liability is precluded.
356
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his justifiable expectations40 Such unforeseen liability could relate back
to the effective date of the Act41 for all class members, thereby becoming
an unjust surprise to the defendant and a windfall to those who have
"slept on their rights."'42 It must be remembered, however, that Title
VII is intended to encourage employers to eliminate discrimination of
their own volition.48 Consequently, if an employer is uncertain whether
his present policy is discriminatory and is convinced that an alternative
complies with Title VII, he should voluntarily adopt it. An employer who
refuses either to adopt the alternative or to consult the EEOC for an
evaluation of his policy cannot be characterized as a good-faith de-
fendant.44
40. A good example of the extent to which courts can go in using the no-limitation
loophole is Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 1 CCH EmPL. PRAc. GUIDE 8229
(D.D.C. Feb. 11, 1971). In this case a class action was brought under both the Equal
Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII. The court divided the class into two subclasses.
Class One was the Equal Pay Act Class, defined as all plaintiffs whose claims were not
barred by that Act's three year statute of limitations. Class Two was the Civil Rights
Act Class. It consisted of current or past employees back to July 2, 1965 (the effective
date of Title VII). These employees could seek back pay to that date to the extent the
Equal Pay Act's statute of limitations prevented recovery thereunder.
41. July 2, 1965. Act § 716(a) ; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (introductory para. at 10293)
(1970).
42. The policy behind statutes of limitation has been stated by the Supreme Court:
[Statutes of limitation are] designed to promote justice by preventing
surprises through revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses, have disappeared.
The theory is that even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the
adversary on notice to defend within the period of limitations and that the
right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to
prosecute them.
Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49
(1944).
43. If Title VII could only be effective through complaints to the EEOC or
through court action, its purpose in eliminating employment discrimination could never
be achieved. FirT ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 26, at 44. Recognizing this fact,
the EEOC has made strong efforts to encourage employer-initiated affirmative action
programs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., former chairman of the EEOC, has stated:
It is our hope that through persuasive and aggressive promotion of affir-
mative action we may be able to achieve more significant results, both quantita-
tive and qualitative, for minority group workers than through the complaint
procedure.
Vass, supra note 11, at 414. See also Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co., 405
F.2d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 1968).
Courts have added impetus to these efforts by holding employers accountable for
acts of discrimination which occurred prior to the effective date of the Act, but which
served to perpetuate discrimination past that date. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420
F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970) ; rev'd on other isues, 401 U.S. 424 (1971) ; HEAT & FROST
Workers, Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Quarles v. Phillip
Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (RD. Va. 1968). Contra, Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW,
292 F. Supp. 413, 443-44 (S.D. Ohio 1969).
44. The EEOC greatly encourages employers to make inquiries of the Commission
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TITLE VII AND CLASS ACTIONS
Although Title VII does not specifically provide for class actions,
Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp.5 held such suits permissible. The court's
holding was based on its conclusion that racial discrimination was by
definition "class" discrimination. 6 Hall also held, however, that class
members who had not filed charges with the EEOC were limited to
injunctive relief."
Subsequent decisions adopted and expanded class action relief but
declined to follow Hall's strict application of procedural requirements.
For example, Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.48 held that membership
in a class action was not limited to persons who had filed charges with
the EEOC. The Oatis court reasoned that requiring every class member
to submit separate charges would be wasteful duplication of effort."o
In Jenkins v. United Gas Corp.,51 the plaintiff brought a class action
to determine if their policies are discriminatory and to create and develop new
practices.
IF YOU NEED HELP, CONTACT THE EEOC'S OFFICE OF
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. Based on information in their possession,
employment specialists will . . . respond to your request for such service.
They will assist you in developing a program uniquely suited to your firm's
needs. They will consult with you and present ideas and suggestions for solving
present and potential EEO problems.
EEOC Suggested Affirinative Action Plai, 1 E PL. PRac. GUIDE 5122. See generally
D. PESKIN, THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF EEO (1970).
That employers are expected to make use of these facilities is emphasized by the
EEOC Chairman in testimony before a congressional committee:
Congress . . . suspended the implementation of this title for a whole year-from
July 1964 to July 1965-to give companies and unions time to correct their'dis-
criminatory practices.
Hearings, supra note 28, at 89.
[I] f the employers and the labor unions in this country are indeed doing theirjobs, and they certainly have able legal counsel to make them aware of what
the probable consequences of their act might be, that they voluntarily will see
fit to end this discrimination..
Id. at 89-90.
45. 251 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
46. Id. at 186. See also Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498-99
(5th Cir. 1968).
47. 251 F. Supp. at 188.
48. 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968).
49. It is true that Oatis involved only injunctive relief and, therefore, it might be
argued that the case does not expand on Hall. A closer analysis of the holding in Oatis
indicates that the court held non-filing class members to possess the same rights as
those filing. The only reason that other class members were limited to injunctive
relief in Oatis is that their filing representative sought only injunctive relief in his initial
complaint. If he had sought other relief, non-filers could have claimed it under the OatLs
holding. See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 720 (7th Cir. 1969) (Oatis
holding applied to claims for back pay).
50. 398 F.2d at 498. See also Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283,
284-85 (5th Cir. 1969).
51. 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'g 261 F. Supp. 762 (E.D. Tex. 1966).
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alleging that his employer discriminated generally against all black
employees and specifically against him by denying a promotion. Although
the lower court dismissed the class suit because the defendant subsequently
promoted Jenkins, 2 the appellate court held that settlement of the indivi-
dual claim did not warrant dismissal of the class action. The court
determined that the public interest required Jenkins to assume the role
of a "private attorney general" suing to end all racial discrimination
within the United Gas plant."3
This continuing favoritism to class actions was, exemplified in
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc." In Johnson the district
court held that membership in a class action brought by a discriminatorily
discharged black employee was limited to other employees similarly dis-
charged.5 The appellate court reversed since the original complainant
had alleged "across the board" discrimination and, thereby, could repre-
sent all black employees who had been discriminated against in any
manner. 6 In the recent case of Taylor v. Springmeier Shipping Co." the
plaintiff brought suit, individually and as a class representative, alleging
racial discrimination. Although the district court dismissed the individual
action as unmeritorious and found Taylor an improper representative of
the class, the court retained jurisdiction over the class claim for six
months in order to permit any "qualified" representative to come for-
ward. 8 Thus, it appears that an original plaintiff's illegitimate claim
was allowed to fulfill Title VII's procedural requirements for the entire
class."
52. 261 F. Supp. 762 (E.D. Tex. 1966).
53. 400 F2d at 32-33. See also Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711,
719-20 (7th Cir. 1969) ; Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir.
1968); Madlock v. Sardis Luggage Co., 302 F. Supp. 866, 875-76 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
54. 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969), reVfg 47 F.R.D. 327 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
55. 47 F.R.D. 327 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
56. 417 F.2d at 1124. Contre, King v. Georgia Power Co., 295 F. Supp. 943, 948(N.D. Ga. 1968), decided on inerits sub twin. United States v. Georgia Power Co., 1
CCH ENL. Pa ,c. Gums: 8318 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 1971).
57. 1 CCH EmPL. PRAc. GUIDE 8298 (W.D. Tenn. July 9, 1971).
58. The court dismissed Taylor's action because he had previously processed
his charge through the union grievance procedure and had received an adverse deter-
mination, precluding him from further court action on the same charge. 1 CCH EML.
PRAc. GuiEs at 6993-20; see Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 332 (6th
Cir. 1970), aff'd, 1 CCH EzOL. PRAc. GUImE 8216 (U.S. June 1, 1971).
59. The court in Taylor is retaining jurisdiction over the class action to permit a
"qualified" class member to come forward and litigate Taylor's claim. Arguably, the
court could demand that a new class representative must have previously filed charges
with the EEOC, as Taylor had done. Since the court is making every effort to maintain
the class action, however, it is not likely that it would put such a limitation upon
a potential class representative.
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SPROGIS AND RuLE 23
In Sprogis, the Seventh Circuit held that "Rule 23 to the contrary
notwithstanding,"'" a federal court could initiate class relief in an indivi-
dual suit after the decision on the merits. The Fifth Circuit in Danner,
however, held that class relief must be predicated upon a "proper class
action complaint satisfying all the requirements of Rule 23."" This
difference of opinion centers on the applicability of rule 23 (c) (1), which
states in part:
60. 444 F.2d at 1201.
61. Mrs. Danner, however, never took up the banner of women's liberation
for all female employees in the Phillips plant. . . . If [other female employees
of Phillips] decide to bring a class action, it must be brought and identified
as such, and the predicate for class action relief must be carefully laid. In
the meantime, Mrs. Danner's victory is for her alone to taste and enjoy.
447 F.2d at 164. The Danner court discussed the possibility that Mrs. Danner's
action might not have met Rule 23's requirements had it been brought originally as a
class action. This possibility seems unlikely. The court questioned the limited number of
beneficiaries of Mrs. Danner's potential class suit, expressing doubt that the number
could satisfy Rule 23 (a) (1), which states in part:
One or more members of a class may sue . . . on behalf of all only if . . .
the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable ...
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (1). However, seventeen persons has been held sufficient to
satisfy this rule, and there were at least thirty female employees in Phillips' plant other
than Mrs. Danner. See Arkansas Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 1 CCII EMP.
PRAc. GUIDE 8292 (8th Cir. July 26, 1971).
The Danner court also expressed doubt that Mrs. Danner might be able to
establish herself as an adequate representative of the class, according to the requirements
of Rule 23(a) (4), which states in part:
One or more members of a class may sue . . . as representative parties on
behalf of all only if . . . (4) the representative parties will fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (4). However, treating the question after the fact (as the
district court did) one could not have asked for a more adequate representative than
Mrs. Danner, who had already won her suit by proving a class-wide pattern of
discrimination.
The Danner court also questioned if Mrs. Danner's possible class suit would
meet the requirements of Rule 23 (b). This contention is of doubtful merit, for most dis-
crimination suits come easily within the classification of the rule, which states in
part:
An action may be maintained as a class action if . . . (2) the party opposing
the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the
class . ..
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (2). The Advisory Committee Notes to the present version of
Rule 23 (b) (2) state:
Action or inaction is directed to a class within the meaning of this subdivision
even if it has taken effect or is threatened only as to one or a few members of the
class, provided it is based on grounds which have general application to the
class.
Illustrative are various actions in the civil-rights field where a party is charged
with discriminating unlawfully against a class ...
Notes of Advisory Committee to 1966 Amendments of Fed. R. Civ. P., 39 F.R.D. 73,
102 (1966).
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As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action
brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order
whether it is to be so maintained.2
It appears, therefore, that the circuits differ on two significant issues:
(1) whether class actions may be initiated by the court and (2) whether
class actions may be allowed after a judgment on the merits.
As to the first issue, the legislative history of rule 23 indicates strong
opposition to court-initiated class actions. Subdivision (c) (1) of the
1964 preliminary draft of rule 23 stated in part:
Where necessary for the protection of a party or of absent
persons, the court, upon motion or on its own initiative at
any time before the decision on the merits of an action brought
as a non-class action may order that it be maintained as a class
action."
Adverse commentary on this section was virtually unanimous. 4 The
commentators reasoned that such judicial power would subject a plaintiff
who merely sought personal relief to the extra time, expense and effort
of a class action. 5 Moreover, since class actions can be voluntarily
dismissed only with the approval of the court, " such conversion could
severely limit the original plaintiff's right to settle his personal claim. As
a result of this opposition, the above portion of the preliminary draft was
excluded from rule 23.17
These arguments, however, seem inappropriate when applied to
class actions created after a favorable judgment on the merits. In such
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
63. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil
Procedure for the United States District Courts, 34 F.R.D. 325, 386 (1964) (emphasis
added).
64. See Judicial Conference of the Ninth Circuit, Report of the Committee on
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 36 F.R.D. 209, 225 (1964) ; Judicial Conference of
the Ninth Circuit, Supplemental Report of the Committee on Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 37 F.R.D. 71 passim (1965); Note, Revised Federal Rule 23, Class
Actions: Surviving Difficulties and New Problenm Require Further Amendment, 52
MiNN. L. REv. 509, 527 (1968).
65. Judicial Conference of the Ninth Circuit, Report of the Committee on Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 36 F.R.D. 209, 225 (1964).
66. A class action shall not be dismissed without the approval of the court,
and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all
members of the class in such manner as the court directs.
FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(e). See generally MooRE, supra note 31, at 1 23.80-.90.
67. Judicial Conference of the Ninth Circuit, Second Supplemental Report of
the Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 37 F.R.D. 499, 522 (1965).
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situations, no extensive effort is required of the original plaintiff.6"
Furthermore, the plaintiff's right to settle his individual claim is rendered
moot by the favorable judgment.
As to the second issue, the legislative history is less revealing.
Although the 1964 preliminary draft of rule 23 stated that a class action
must be determined "as soon as practicable . . . and before the decision
on the merits. . . . "" the emphasized language was deleted, without
explanation, from the adopted rule.7" It could be argued that this
deletion was made to permit Sprogis-type relief where justice requires.
Moreover, the remaining vague limitation of "as soon as practicable"
seemingly grants courts broad discretion in deciding when to make a
class determination. 71
A close examination of the reasons for rule 23, however, proves
this-argument unfounded. The former version of the rule permitted a
"spurious" class action in which judgments were binding only on those
who consented to class membership."2 Courts began applying this rule
68. Plaintiff need only amend his original complaint to admit other class members
and show to the court that the action satisfies rule 23. The latter burden certainly
does not seem difficult since the court has already exhibited its favorable opinion of
the propriety of a class action in this case.
69. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference
of the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of
Cvill Procedure for the United States District Courts, 34 F.R.D. 325, 386 (1964)
(emphasis added).
70. On March 12, 1965 the Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of
the Judicial Conference of the Ninth Circuit rejected a preliminary draft of the
proposed rules which contained the phrase, "before the decision on the merits." 37 F.R.D.
71 (1965). On June 21, 1965 the committee again rejected the preliminary draft but
noted certain improvements over the draft of March 12, including deletion of the
phrase. 37 F.R.D. 499, 500, 522 (1965).
The statement of an American Bar Association committee is most appropriate on
this point:
In modifying its March, 1964 draft the revised notes of the Advisory Com-
mittee do not indicate reasons for changes. . . . Since this legislative history
is often extremely difficult to reconstruct, it would be helpful, in the future,
where the problem may arise, to indicate reasons for changes.
Report of ABA Special Committee on Federal Rules of Procedure, 38 F.R.D. 95, 105
(1965).
71. But see Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324, 326
(E.D. Pa. 1967): "Rule 23(c) (1) contemplates a prompt determination after the
filing of the action."
72. The spurious class suit was actually only a permissive joinder device. The
sole requirement for class membership was alleged possession of a claim having a
question of law or fact in common with that of the plaintiff. No other legal relation-
ship was necessary among spurious class members. They were simply invited to enter the
litigation-an invitation they could accept or decline. Traditional permissive joinder
differed only in its insistence that jurisdictional prerequisites like diversity of
citizenship and sufficient amount in controversy be met by the putative coplaintiff.
See MooRx, supra note 31, at 23.10(1) ; BARON & HOLTZOFF, supra note 31, at § 562.3.
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to permit non-consenting class members to intervene after a favorable
decision and to share in the benefits of the judgment.7' The Advisory
Committee's notes to rule 23, however, indicate a strong policy against
this practice of "one-way intervention":
[O]ne-way intervention is excluded; the action will have been
early determined to be a class or nonclass action, and in the
former case the judgment, whether or not favorable, will include
the class, as above stated.7"
The relief permitted in Sprogis is indistinguishable from "one-way
intervention" because nonparticipating individuals gained the benefit of
a judgment which would not have bound them in a subsequent action.
Such a result is in conflict with the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel,
which provides that a party cannot bind his opponent to an issue litigated
in a, prior suit unless the proponent is also bound by the earlier deter-
mination of that issue." The underlying rationale against "one-way
intervention" and favoring mutuality of estoppel is one of basic equity.
This principle was forcefully stated by Circuit Judge Stevens, dissenting
in Sprogis:
A procedure which permits a claim to be treated as a class
action if plaintiff wins, but merely as an individual claim if
plaintiff loses, is strikingly unfair."6
73. In Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961),
a group of miners filed a "spurious" class action against certain mining companies,
alleging an antitrust violation. After determining the liability of the companies, the
court permitted nonparticipating miners to intervene and share in the judgment gained
by their participating representatives. The court of appeals concluded:
Defendant's liability and the extent thereof has been competently proven by
the named plaintiffs and it would be grossly redundant to say that it must
be proven again by the unnamed members of the represented class.
Id. at 589. See also York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503, 529 (2d Cir. 1944),
re'd on otlwr grounds, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). Cf. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 43(1940).
74. Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules Relating to 1966 Amendments of
Fed. R. Civ. P. z3 (c) (3), 39 F.R.D. 69, 106 (1966).
75. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942); 1 A. FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS
929 (1925). Opinion on the current status of the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel
is quite varied. Some claim the doctrine no longer exists. B. R. Dewitt, Inc. v. Hall,
19 N.Y.2d 141, 147, 225 N.E.2d 195, 198, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 601 (1967): "[T]he
'doctrine of mutuality' is a dead letter." Others find little merit in the doctrine. See
B. Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the BERNHA D Doctrine, 9
STAN. L. REv. 281, 322 (1957). A few take notice of the doctrine's decline, but oppose
these efforts to destroy it. Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judg-
inents, 35 Tum. L. PEv. 301 (1961). One commentator maintains that the doctrine is
still viable. Greenebaum, It Defense of the Doctrine of Mutuality of Estoppel, 45
Im. L.J. 1 (1969).
76. 444 F.2d 1194, 1207 (7th Cir. 1971) (dissenting opinion of Stevens, Cir. J.).
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The unfairness of Sprogis-type relief is manifested in two ways.
First, it grants the benefits of a favorable judgment to persons who
failed to assert their rights and assumed no risks of an adverse judgment.
Second, it denies the defendant notice of his potential liability. Although
it may be argued that considerations of judicial economy mitigate these
forms of unfairness," an important purpose of determining a class action
"as soon as practicable" is to give the defendant adequate notice to
prepare the legal and financial aspects of his case." In Sprogis, for
example, United Air Lines probably would have litigated its case with
greater vigor had it known that the resulting judgment might include
many former employees. Moreover, a company aware of potential class
liability could better prepare to absorb a large financial loss.
PROMOTION OF TITLE VII POLICIES
The result in Sprogis can be justified in several ways. First, it
compensates for the reluctance of employees to enforce their Title VII
rights. Of the Title VII charges in which the EEOC has notified com-
plainants of their right to sue, only ten per cent have resulted in actual
lawsuits." Most potential Title VII complainants are of modest means
and education, with little legal awareness."0 Furthermore, a worker is
unlikely to file a class action because his economic needs force him to
think foremost of individual relief.8 ' Thus, individual reluctance to
initiate lengthy and expensive law suits is not surprising. 2 Application of
77. The defendant in Sprogis has had its "day in court" on the issue of the
validity of its no-marriage rule, and it has lost. Requiring similarly discharged
stewardesses to relitigate this same issue would only further clog the busy courts.
Sprogis-type relief could backfire, however. If such relief becomes common,
defendants will, under threat of possible class liability, be forced to litigate every in-
dividual suit to the fullest degree.
78. See Weithers, Amended Rule 23: A Defendant's Point of View, 10 B.C.
IND. & Com. L. REV. 515, 522 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Weithers] :
Prior to the determination of the class issue, the defendant does not know
if the plaintiff represents himself, or a group of persons whose alleged
combined loss would be of such magnitude that the very economic life of
a defendant would be in jeopardy.
Prompt determination of class actions also benefits potential plaintiffs. See
Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39,
40-41 (1967).
79. FEDERAL EFFORT, supra note 25, at 110.
80. R. NATHAN, JOBS AND CIVIL RIGHTS 48 (1969).
81. In one class action, the court and counsel consumed over three years in the
attempt to resolve questions relating to the identification of members of the class,
determination of the amount of the total award and other postjudgment problems.
See Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. .1962) ; Weithers,
supra note 78, at 523.
82. Another reason why employees hesitate to bring Title VII charges is fear
of retaliation.
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Sprogis-type relief will satisfy these unprosecuted and possibly meritorious
claims.
Second, the result fulfills the dual policies of the Act. Title VII is
both a public and a private law, concerned with ending employment
discrimination as well as with compensating an aggrieved individual."
Without judicial activism as exemplified in Sprogis, the purpose of
eradicating employment discrimination may fail. The importance of elim-
inating employment discrimination is emphasized by the United States
Civil Rights Commission's study of the impact of civil rights legislation
up to 1970:
[E]vidence . . . indicates that employment discrimination in
the private sector is still prevalent throughout the United
States.
The plain fact is that some of these laws are not working well.
The Federal civil rights effort has been inadequate to redeem in
full the promise of true "equal protection of the laws" for all
Americans. As a result, many minority group members are
losing faith in the Federal Government's will and capacity to
protect their rights. Some are losing faith that equality can be
achieved through law. It is important that their faith be restored
and that the promise of the hard fought battle for civil rights
laws be redeemed.8"
Although Sprogis violates the policies underlying rule 23, it sup-
ports the policies of Title VII as interpreted by the courts.85 Rule 23
Experience has shown that in many cases people who have legitimate com-
plaints of discrimination do not file charges. . . . Frequently an individual
feels that be has much to lose if he files a complaint. . . . In some companies
the individuals who file complaints are branded as troublemakers.
FEDERAL EFFORT, supra note 25, at 96, n.604 (1971). See also Title VII, supra note 21,
at 1228-29.
83. See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 720 (7th Cir. 1969) ; Oatis
v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968).
The trial judge in a Title VII case bears a special responsibility in the
public interest to resolve the employment dispute, for once the judicial
machinery has been set in train, the proceeding takes on a public character
in which remedies are devised to vindicate the policies of the Act, not
merely to afford private relief to the employee.
Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 311 (5th Cir. 1970). See also
Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 32 (5th Cir. 1968); Hall v. Werthan Bag
Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 187 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
84. FEDERAL EFFORT, supra note 25, at xv, 12.
85. The House of Representatives has reacted adversely to the courts' expansion
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limits class actions because of inequities to the defendant. Courts have
sought to end employment discrimination by expanding class relief.
The ultimate question, therefore, is one of balancing the inequities to the
defendant against the inequities of class discrimination.
JOHN F. CRAWFORD
of Title VII relief through class actions. H.R. 1746, passed by the House on September
16, 1971, amends § 706(g) of the original Act to read, in part:
No order of the court shall require the . . . hiring, reinstatement, or
promotion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back
pay, if such individual, pursuant to section 706(a) and within the time required
by section 706(d), neither filed a charge nor was named in a charge or amend-
ment thereto ...
H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § (h) (1971).
This provision severely limits class actions in Title VII cases. The amendment
requires an original plaintiff to name specifically in his EEOC complaint anyone he
wishes to include in a class action. Thus, "across the board" plantwide discrimination
cases would be prohibited.
Congressman Erlenborn, sponsor of this amendment, explained the section:
We would also provide in a class action a limitation so that those who
join in the class action or those who by timely motion intervene could be
considered as the proper class, but not all who may be similarly situated but
who are not even aware of the fact that a case has been filed.
117 CoNG. REc. 8474 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1971).
Congressman Augustus Hawkins (D., Cal.), who opposed the Erlenborn bill,
describes the effect of the amendments as follows:
It is not court enforcement which is the main purpose of the Erlenborn
substitute but changes in the existing law which will . . . limit if not emascu-
late, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Id. at 8464.
